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Abstract 
 
The prolific integration of technology into medical 
environments is continuously generating new attack 
vectors. This continuous amalgamation of technology 
into the medical field prompted the idea that risk 
assessment models can be utilized to identify cyber 
security vulnerabilities in medical settings. This 
research presents an initial investigation into the 
application of risk assessment frame works, i.e., 
STRIDE, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, and 
a Common Vulnerability Scoring System to identified 
networked medical devices that are currently employed 
in an operational medical simulation lab. The 
contribution of this research is twofold and culminates 
in a novel proof-of-concept system known as 
MedDevRisk. First, it demonstrates an approach to 
incorporating existing threat models into a relational 
database schema based on Threat-Vulnerability-Asset 
(TVA) relationships. Second, it provides an initial 
empirical analysis of the risk associated with 
networked medical devices along with providing the 
foundation for future research.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In today’s world, medical devices have transitioned 
from isolated, stand-alone systems into networked 
medical devices that are heavily dependent on 
software.  In 2013, Alemzadeh et al. [1] discerned a 
70% increase in medical device recalls reported to the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
along with a 103% increase in adverse events between 
2006 and 2011. The authors also noted that 23% of all 
medical device recalls were computer-related failures, 
which include any malfunction of the device’s 
hardware, software, input, output, or battery. 
Complicating matters, many medical devices 
contain and transmit patient data to other devices and 
network servers [2], which levies the requirement on 
organizations and manufacturers to protect such data in 
transit and at rest [2, 3]. The use of software in a 
networked environment also opens the risk for 
malware to infect computers that control medical 
devices [4]. Due to the reliance on medical devices and 
control software, many new vulnerabilities are being 
introduced into patient care environments, with 
consequences of compromise ranging from loss of 
essential equipment necessary to treat patients, to data 
integrity being violated [5].  
Healthcare organizations that use and manage 
medical devices face potential problems if outdated or 
unsupported software is not kept updated on a regular 
basis.  Likewise, knowing which preventative 
measures to apply so that risk will be mitigated long-
term is typically left to the expertise or experience of 
the network administrators and information technology 
(IT) staff [2, 5, 6]. Such variability can pose severe 
problems in safety critical environments, like medical 
devices, which require constant contact while in 
service [7]. Current research also indicates that there 
are risks associated with networked medical devices 
that could, potentially, lead to further patient injury or 
even death, if unresolved [8]. This is further 
highlighted by academic activity investigating ways to 
compromise surgical environments [9] along with the 
development of solutions that integrate forensic 
principles into the design and development of Medical 
Cyber-Physical Systems [10].  
In order to address the need for actionable threat 
assessment criteria for healthcare organizations to 
govern the use of medical devices on their networks, 
this research poses a novel framework known as 
MedDevRisk with the following key features: 1) use of 
a relational data model capturing medical device 
threats, assets, and vulnerabilities, 2) use of 
conventional risk assessment standards, and 3) data 
from a real-world health-related organization. This 
framework provides a relational integration of network 
device information with their attendant security threats 
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and potential remediation steps. The consolidation of 
these data provide underlying relationships which can 
answer risk assessment questions pertinent to both 
lower-level administrators and higher level managers 
that make decisions on money and resources.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in the 
following manner. Section two provides background 
on risk modeling along with relevant related work. 
Section three elaborates on the fundamental 
motivations and assumptions associated with the 
development methodology. Section four highlights key 
features of the framework implementation and section 
five provides conclusions and plans for future work.  
 
2. Background and Related Work 
 
The continued amalgamation of technology into the 
medical field raises concerns about risk and how that 
risk is perceived in a medical context [9, 11, 12]. 
Pairing the growing concerns about risk with the 
impact that residual data appears to have, in legal 
context, serves to escalate interest in risk mitigation 
solutions [13-15]. Hence, this interest has prompted 
previous work in databases and proposed frameworks 
[16, 17] for assessing risk. 
 
2.1. Governing Organizations and Law 
  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
responsible for the protection of the public’s health by 
regulating the medical device safety and security [18]. 
In 2013, the FDA released the Content of Premarket 
Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in 
Medical Devices concerning how manufacturers and 
the healthcare industry should approach cybersecurity 
in medical devices [18]. The FDA guidelines require 
lists of cybersecurity risks, controls, countermeasures, 
and instructions for medical devices from the 
manufacturers. In the United States, the healthcare 
industry must implement the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
which mandates the privacy of protected health 
information of patients by covering information 
privacy, information security, and standardization of 
data [19]. Though most of the healthcare industry 
already has problems ensuring good practices, there are 
information security issues, such as vulnerable 
networks, that frequently remain overlooked [19]. 
 
2.2. Risk Assessment 
  
The tacit understanding of risk is the possibility that 
a vulnerability will be exploited by a threat to cause 
damage to an asset [20]. Risk is, commonly, calculated 
as a combination of the probability that an adverse 
event will occur and the impact (severity), if the event 
actually does occur. Overall, the entire objective of 
security is essentially risk prevention through the 
removal of vulnerabilities and preventing threat agents 
from endangering assets [20]. Hence, risk assessment 
and analysis encompass methods for the categorization 
and distribution of information concerning the security 
risks related to the organization’s infrastructure [21]. A 
risk assessment, as defined by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), is a “process of 
identifying, estimating, and prioritizing information 
security risks” [22, 23]. Brown [24] agrees and 
expands this definition to include cultivating mitigation 
strategies. Gerber’s research [25] concluded that after 
completing a risk analysis, security controls can 
effectively decrease risks. Ultimately, risk analysis 
should result in greater protection for technology-
related assets and data. Yue et al. [26] further state that 
security risk management has developed into a crucial 
obligation for IT managers and staff.  Thus, the 
MedDevRisk framework derives its inspiration from 
the need to provide relevant risk assessment for health 
and health-care related organizations. 
 
2.3. Conventional Risk Models 
  
MedDevRisk leverages several nomenclatures 
promoted by Microsoft and MITRE that are in 
common use in government and industry. These 
include the STRIDE threat model, Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), and the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The 
STRIDE threat model (Figure 1) is a mnemonic that 
categorizes threats into spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, 
and elevation of privileges [27, 28]. According to 
Shostack [28], each of the six threat classifications are 
attack methods that could exploit the components of 
information assurance and each has an attendant 
security property that would address the threat. The 
STRIDE model is used extensively as part of 
Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) to 
help define the attack surface [27, 28].  
 
 
Figure 1. STRIDE threat model. 
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CVE is a public dictionary created by the MITRE 
Corporation that encompasses a collection of known 
information security vulnerabilities and exposures with 
the purpose of offering common identifiers for 
cybersecurity threats [29].  CVSS is a risk assessment 
framework for modeling cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
quantitatively, in addition to providing impact scores 
based on three metric groups: base, temporal, and 
environmental exposures [30]. The CVSS model is 
presented in Figure 2. These standard nomenclatures 
and models provide a real-world context for how the 
MedDevRisk framework formulates and presents risk 
assessment evaluations. 
 
 
Figure 2. CVSS metric groups [30]. 
 
2.4. MeDRa  
 
One of the few published frameworks that 
evaluates medical device risk is documented by Brown 
[24]. His electronic medical devices risk assessment 
tool (MeDRa) is healthcare environment centric. 
MeDRa creates a risk profile for each device 
classification and each potential device setting that is 
connected to an intranet. Device assessment in MeDRa 
is based on clinical environment usage. For example, a 
medical device that is frequently used in large hospitals 
by well-trained staff has a lower risk value than the 
same medical device that is not commonly used in 
smaller environments [21]. The risk referenced in 
Brown’s research is based on the Australian Standard 
As/NzS4360, statistical analysis, and risk observations 
as defined by healthcare professionals. In primary 
contrast to our proposed framework, MeDRa creates a 
risk assessment for each medical device based on user 
responses from a series of yes/no questions concerning 
organizational communication and culture, staff skills 
and knowledge, device operation and use, and device 
maintenance. Users that are considered in the 
published evaluation of MeDRa include nurses, allied 
health professionals, consultants, and other medical 
staff. The MeDRa tool outputs a medical device risk 
assessment report and a mitigation plan as raw data in 
Microsoft Excel.  
Brown’s [24] major finding focused on how the use 
of the risk assessments, compiled from feedback from 
healthcare professionals and analyzed using statistical 
methods, compared to the Australian Risk Standard. 
The official risk ratings for most devices are defined as 
very low, whereas the results from the MeDRa tool and 
analysis proved that the devices could potentially have 
a higher risk rating. According to Brown  [24], the 
major limitation of the MeDRa study is that risks 
identified by healthcare professionals could be biased 
[24]. In contrast, the MedDevRisk framework utilizes 
CVE and CVSS nomenclature as the qualitative basis 
for assigning vulnerability exposures and scores. 
While there is research in the broader area of risk 
assessments that utilize relational databases, minimal 
research exists that successfully integrates multiple risk 
models into a database framework using real-world 
data. The MedDevRisk framework brings these key 
features together into a unified context. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
In order to investigate the key features of the 
MedDevRisk framework, this research conducted a 
case study as defined by Yin [31] and discussed by 
Oates [32]. The following approach was implemented 
to identify real-world risks faced by medical and health 
organizations based on their networked medical 
devices. 
1. Schema Selection: A database schema was 
selected from prior work, modified to utilize 
several security nomenclatures and implemented. 
2. Normalization: The selected database schema 
was then examined for normalization. 
3. Data Acquisition: A list of medical devices was 
acquired from the College of Nursing Human-
Patient Simulation Unit at the University of South 
Alabama (USA).  
4. Schema Adaptation: The database was examined 
for appropriate tables, columns, rows, and data 
fields. It was then expanded, where necessary. 
5. Threat Model Categorization: Threat models 
were applied to categorize the data. This paper 
reports only the STRIDE model integration. 
6. Asset Data Entry: The data acquired from the 
simulation lab was entered into the database to 
populate assets.  
7. Vulnerability Categorization: The models were 
then applied to identify vulnerabilities. 
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8. View Generation: The database was then 
modified to create schema views to support 
multiple levels of query. 
9. Vulnerability Data Entry: The vulnerabilities 
were then input into the database. 
10. Query Development: Queries were then 
developed to highlight vulnerabilities that targeted 
two managerial perspectives: low-level IT 
managers of technology and high-level decision 
makers like CTOs, CISOs, and CIOs. 
11. Result Analysis: The queries were executed and 
the results were collected for analysis. 
 
Figure 3 diagrams the flow of the MedDevRisk 
framework and its components. More specifically, the 
flow diagram illustrates how the database schemas, 
threat models, the case study data collected from the 
simulation unit and any additional research ties into the 
flow of the new database and its outputs. As noted in 
the data relationships portion of Figure 3, the STRIDE 
threat model and use of the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) risk data may be included as part of 
the inclusion of existing threat modelling techniques 
into the database. 
 
 
Figure 3. MedDevRisk framework. 
 
3.1. Schema Selection and Normalization 
 
The MedDevRisk relational framework builds upon 
the work of Pardue et al. [16], which uses a database-
driven approach to assess risk. This work implemented 
a threat-vulnerability-asset (TVA) model using 
healthcare-related threats and countermeasures. As a 
proof-of-concept, the authors populated a relational 
database with hypothetical data involving security 
vulnerabilities in healthcare.  
Pardue et al.’s [16] schema, as seen in Figure 4, 
was based on the TVA model and included entities 
such as threat, vulnerability, asset, control, threat 
source, cause, and domain. They organized threats by 
ranking how much risk is associated with a particular 
threat. They extracted data through the use of the 
structured query language (SQL) to manipulate the 
data and execute queries to identify threats, controls 
and countermeasures. As a proof-of-concept model, 
their solution formed pertinent risk assessment 
outcomes using query capabilities. In Cerkovnik’s 
unpublished thesis work [17], the TVA-based approach 
proposed by Pardue et al. [16] was investigated as a 
potential framework for integrating various threat and 
vulnerability data associated with medical devices. 
This study collected a small data sample from various 
sources including the Manufacturer and User Facility 
Device Experience (MAUDE) database [33], the FDA 
Medical Product Safety Network (MedSun) [34], 
Shodan [35], and FDA’s 510(k) database Pre-Market 
Notification database [36].  
 
 
Figure 4. Base TVA schema [15]. 
 
Although Cerkovnik’s [17] work provided an 
experimental basis for how to tailor the TVA approach 
for specific medical terminology and categories, the 
resulting schema was independent from the base TVA 
relationships. As our contribution, the MedDevRisk 
framework and database (seen in Figure 5) provides a 
unifying schema with new tables, fields, underlying 
views, underlying queries, and context-specific 
relationships that captures a broader set of features for 
analyzing risk in medical devices. For instance, two 
new tables were added to the initial schema in order to 
normalize the database and include new categories of 
medical devices, i.e. tblDevice and tblInventory.  
The new tblDevice table is connected to the risk 
assessment database using a one-to-many relationship 
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to tblAsset. Because the attributes in the table tblAsset 
is composed of general terms used for cyber assets or 
devices (e.g. an operating system, smart phone, or 
electronic patient health record), “Medical Devices” 
was inserted, as a new item, into the tblAsset.  The 
AssetID field is used to categorize the types of 
devices, whether it is the server, router, laptop, or 
medical device. 
The device table, tblDevice, was created to hold 
cyber asset data types so that multiple devices could be 
associated with any type of asset. For instance, an 
electrocardiogram and a defibrillator are both medical 
device assets, but would be listed as separate devices in 
the tblDevice table. The table tblDevice contains 
attributes related to the types of the devices and the 
descriptions of those devices. 
In addition to tblDevice, a new table was created 
that is designed to contain the location and the actual 
device’s specific information for individual devices 
called tblInventory. This table is used for each device 
that is on-site in the facility and can account for 
multiple devices of the same type of device. The idea is 
that each facility or hospital could have more than one 
of the same type of device, such as multiple laptops or 
multiple patient monitors. 
 
3.2. Data Acquisition 
 
To validate and exercise the enhanced relational 
schema, an experimental case study was performed 
based on the collection of real-world data from the 
USA’s School of Nursing, Human–Patient Simulation 
Program. The Simulation Unit contains high-quality 
medical simulators and devices used for realistic 
training in healthcare clinical scenarios. These 
scenarios are used to train future doctors, nurses, and 
healthcare professionals. They are also routinely used 
to assist with continuing education efforts for 
practitioners.  
The USA Simulation Unit provided a list of 
networked medical devices. The list of medical devices 
was, initially, evaluated and three networked medical 
devices were input into the relational database model. 
The devices selected include LifeSync Wireless 
Electrocardiogram (ECG) Systems, Physio-Control 
LIFEPAK Defibrillators, and Laerdal VitalSim Vital 
Signs Simulators. The LifeSync Wireless 
Electrocardiogram (ECG) System transmits ECG 
signals and patient data wirelessly from the patient to 
the ECG monitor. The LifeSync Wireless System uses 
“a radio-frequency signal transmitter and receiver of 
diagnostic electrocardiographic physiological signals 
which are displayed on the ECG monitors of various 
manufacturers’ systems” [37]. A Physio-Control 
LIFEPAK Defibrillator is a wireless acute cardiac care 
response system in a single, portable device.  Each of 
medical device type in the device list has at least one 
model number and may be listed on the list more than 
once (i.e., multiple devices in inventory). 
 
 3.3. Schema Adaptation 
 
Based on the starting TVA schema, three specific 
adaptations were chosen that extend the core entities 
based on their relevance to risk assessment and 
availability of current data: 1) Threat: Applied SQL 
views using STRIDE; 2) Vulnerability: Applied SQL 
views using NVD (CVE/CVSS/CWE); and 3) Asset: 
Modified database to include device-specific data. 
Existing threat and vulnerability frameworks were 
integrated into the relational database model, including 
the STRIDE [27] threat model, Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [29], Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE), and Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [30].  
The STRIDE model [27] is the threat categorization 
model applied towards the threat component of the 
TVA-based relational database. CVE [29], which is a 
cybersecurity vulnerability identifier, and CVSS [30], 
which is a risk assessment of the CVE cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, are the vulnerability threat modeling 
techniques and resources applied to the vulnerability 
component of the database. The National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) provides the CVSS for CVE entries. 
To account for assets in the TVA model, the asset 
component of the relational database was expanded by 
adding the device and inventory tables. The table 
tblDevice plays another role as well. Each CVE and 
CVSS reflects the vulnerabilities and risk score of 
medical devices, this information is recorded in 
tblDevice.  
Device vulnerabilities were identified using reports, 
manuals, and U.S. Government resources such as FDA 
MedSun reports [34] and the National Vulnerability 
Database [38]. To reduce complexity in the database, 
SQL views are used to pull the attributes needed from 
tables to model threats. This allows the examination of 
the data through a diverse threat model lens. 
 
3.4. Threat Model Categorization 
 
In order to support threat assessment, each category 
of the STRIDE threat model was researched in order to 
assign threat actions appropriately. Each threat was 
classified by two STRIDE categories based directly on 
the ThreatCategoryID and the ThreatAction. 
Two primary threat actions that were used include 1) 
“Disclose Patient Health Information”, which is 
directly related to information disclosure in STRIDE, 
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and 2) “Manipulate Patient Health Information”, which 
is tampering in STRIDE. 
 
 
Figure 5. MedDevRisk database schema. 
STRIDE categories were created based on attacker 
motivation and threat actions: 1) STRIDE_ 
Motivation relates what happened to the data or the 
motivation for the threat, i.e. whether disclosure or data 
manipulation was in view, and 2) STRIDE_Action 
relates how the threat happened or what action 
occurred, e.g. Man-in-the-Middle attack or IP 
Spoofing. One type of threat action (SQL Injection 
attacks) covered more than two STRIDE categories. 
This attack affects Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information Disclosure, and Elevation of Privilege 
[39]. The attacker could potentially steal an identity, 
remove logs, change their privileges, or perform data 
leakage and alteration. Figure 6 provides a partial view 
of STRIDE categories. 
 
 
Figure 6. STRIDE view mapping. 
 
3.5. Asset Data Entry 
 
A SQL Server database was used to implement the 
MedDevRisk schema, associated views, and queries. 
The database was populated with the network medical 
devices from the Human-Patient Simulation Unit.  The 
list contains ten (10) different types of medical devices, 
a total of twenty-seven (27) different models of the 
types of medical devices collectively, and a total of 
forty-five (45) medical devices in inventory. Of the ten 
(10) different types of medical devices, eight (8) 
devices are high-fidelity or medium-fidelity medical 
simulators. High-fidelity medical device examples 
include the CAE iStan Adult Simulators and the 
Gaumard Noelle Birthing Simulators, which are full-
sized, wireless adult medical mannequins. The other 
two types of medical devices are electrocardiograms 
and defibrillators. 
Device-specific data for tblDevice was collected 
using manufacturer reports, user manuals, and 
technical specification sheets issued by the 
manufacturer. The collected data was then matched to 
appropriate attributes in tblDevice for each device. 
Rows were inserted into tblInventory for each item by 
serial number. Identified vulnerabilities and CVSS 
Metric values from NVD Vulnerability Summaries for 
CVEs for each device were also matched to the 
tblVulnerability attributes [30, 38]. 
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3.6. Vulnerability Categorization & Entry 
 
In addition to device manuals, user guides, and 
technical specifications released by the manufacturer, 
the following online resources were utilized to collect 
device-specific data and vulnerabilities: FDA 
MAUDE, FDA Medical Product Safety Network (FDA 
MedSun), Shodan, FDA’s 510(k) Pre-Market 
Notification database, FDA Recalls, and the NVD, 
which contains information for CVE, CVSS, and 
CWE. Vulnerability data was inserted into 
tblVulnerability for each device for a total of 31 
vulnerabilities. The AssetID for Medical Devices and 
the ThreatDomainID for Healthcare was used for all 
vulnerability entries. 
For each vulnerability, at least one potential threat 
action was identified. For each threat action, potential 
controls were identified that could be implemented as 
mitigation strategies. Each combination of 
vulnerability type, threat action, and control received 
its own vulnerability entry in tblVulnerability. 
Additionally, some vulnerabilities were identified that 
could be exploited by different threat sources: a 
human-deliberate insider, human-deliberate outsider, 
or human unintentional insider. If a vulnerability had 
more than one threat source, it was listed multiple 
times.  
Often, one attribute affected another. For example, 
if a human-unintentional insider exploits the Laerdal 
VitalSim Vital Signs Simulator’s vulnerability by 
disclosing health information through the extraction of 
data through a USB drive, the main control is 
identified as educating the Medical Staff about the 
severity, consequences, fines and penalties related to a 
data breach. However, if the same vulnerability is 
exploited by a human-deliberate insider, by using 
malware to attack the device through a USB drive, then 
more evasive controls should be implemented, such as 
applying security patches and software updates. 
 
3.7. View Generation 
 
SQL VIEWs were developed to extract relevant 
data from tblVulnerability and to provide renaming of 
attributes to match our acquired CVE, CVSS, and 
CWE data. Essentially, the same database data is 
examined differently using multiple vulnerability and 
risk assessment frameworks. Similarly to the data 
insertion process, the database attributes were 
translated into NVD-based attributes that focused on 
CVE and CVSS values.  
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
provides the CVSS for CVE entries and includes the 
CWE into each Vulnerability Summary for the CVE. 
The NVD Vulnerability Summary for a CVE was 
applied to the database using SQL VIEWs. CVEs were 
then searched for that included networked medical 
devices in the vulnerability database using search terms 
like medicine, medical device, insulin pump, infusion 
pump, defibrillator, and pacemaker.  
As a result, we found a total of  eight (8) CVEs for 
infusion pumps (e.g. Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion 
System), five (5) CVEs for insulin pumps (e.g. Johnson 
& Johnson Animas OneTouch Ping and Medtronic 
Paradigm wireless insulin pump), two (2) CVEs for 
pacemakers (pacemaker management system), and two 
(2) CVEs for defibrillators (e.g. ZOLL Defibrillator). 
Examining multiple CVE examples online allowed 
for the translation of the CVE data into our database 
from metrics into table attributes. The following 
vulnerability attributes were identified from the CVE 
data: Vulnerability Type ID, Threat Action 
ID, Threat Domain ID, Threat Source ID, and 
Scenario.  
Relevant information from the Scenario attribute 
was included in tblVulnerability as a baseline. 
ControlIDs were then selected based on the identified 
vulnerabilities and threats. For instance, 
countermeasures were identified that should be 
implemented to aid in prevention of a future 
application-layer or denial of service attacks, such as 
inspecting database traffic and implementing network 
precautions. 
CVSS data in the NVD entry were used to identify 
the impact values for the device and decided how to 
implement the values in tblVulnerability in the 
database. Based on the CVSS data in the Impact 
section of the NVD entry, the following 
tblVulnerability attributes were identified: Riskiness, 
Likelihood, Attacker Motivation, Attack 
Difficulty, Impact, and Explanation. The 
Explanation attributes contains additional 
descriptions of impact metrics such as Access 
Vector, Access Complexity, Authentication, 
and Impact Type.  
After determining vulnerability values to insert into 
the database for testing, SQL INSERT queries were 
written to insert the vulnerability data into 
tblVulnerability. Because tblVulnerability does not 
contain device-specific attributes and only contains an 
AssetID, the device’s name, manufacturer, and model 
number(s) that apply to the vulnerability in the 
Scenario attribute were included. To link the 
Vulnerability ID to a Device ID, a LIKE 
expression is used in the WHERE clause to match the 
Device Name, Manufacturer, and Model Number 
to the vulnerability. 
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3.8. Query Development 
 
SQL queries were written to retrieve the case study 
networked medical devices and highlight each 
networked medical device’s vulnerabilities using the 
TVA Model, the STRIDE Threat Model, and the NVD 
Vulnerability Summary for CVEs. For the STRIDE 
model and NVD framework, SQL VIEWs were 
utilized to select data.  
An SQL query that focuses on the STRIDE 
categories was developed to highlight the 
vulnerabilities of our case study medical devices. 
STRIDE was implemented by selecting the Threat 
Action ID first, the STRIDE Action categories 
second, the STRIDE Motivation categories third, 
the description of the Threat Action fourth, and the 
device-related attributes fifth. Then, additional 
attributes from tblVulnerability like riskiness, 
likelihood and impact were included in the query. 
 
4. MedDevRisk Result Analysis  
 
The research successfully identified existing 
relational database-driven system research, originally 
proposed by Pardue et al. [16], that could be modified 
and expanded for the purposes of integrating a 
prioritized risk mitigation strategy for networked 
medical devices. In the expanded system, attributes 
were selected using a ranking methodology to organize 
the threats, to assess the risk of a threat, and prioritize 
resources as part of the risk assessment. Threat risk 
modeling and vulnerability frameworks were 
successfully incorporated into the risk assessment by 
using our STRIDE and CVE VIEWs. The results of the 
implementation for the STRIDE view are presented in 
Figure 6.  
A proof-of-concept case-study, using real-world 
data from a practicing medical simulation training unit 
was successfully implemented using the developed 
model. The reports generated, as a result of the case 
study, contain a ranked list of medical devices and 
associated vulnerabilities. Specialized SQL queries and 
views were initially developed to conveniently access 
information from multiple perspectives and then they 
were implemented in reports. Figure 7 provides a 
sample view of the mapping between NVD reported 
vulnerability scores and database specific fields where 
risk score, impact, and likelihood are tied together.  
The MedDevRisk framework provides ability to 
directly tie reported vulnerability risk scores from 
CVSS rankings directly into reporting features. The 
SQL queries for the Risk Assessment reports focus on 
a list of devices with each device’s CVSS Metrics, 
vulnerability data, and STRIDE categorizations of the 
related threat actions. The main Risk Assessment 
Report combines all threat risk modeling and 
vulnerability frameworks that were incorporated into 
the database. A Risk Assessment Report is provided in 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 7. Database values to NVD values. 
 
 
Figure 8. MedDevRisk risk assessment report. 
 
The SQL queries for the Mitigation Report contain 
a list of ranked controls by number of vulnerabilities, a 
list of medical devices matched to their controls, and a 
list of controls and devices ranked by CVSS Metrics to 
determine the order of implementation. The final 
Mitigation Report is organized by device and contains 
ranked controls per device by CVSS Metrics. 
Therefore, a total of five reports was created. An 
example of a Mitigation report is provided in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. MedDevRisk mitigation report. 
 
Three specialized Risk Assessment Reports were 
then created that reflect the TVA Model, STRIDE 
Model, and NVD Summary for CVEs were created 
during the course of this research. An example of a 
STRIDE report is available in Figure 10. The report 
presents each device on a separate page, provides the 
STRIDE Motivation, the STRIDE Action, ranked 
vulnerability risk, NVD-Based and STRIDE Data 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
The unrelenting amalgamation of technology into 
healthcare organizations creates an environment that is 
conducive to an attack. Hence, the risk that technology 
is presenting to medical situations is generating interest 
in industry and academia.  
 
 
Figure 10. MedDevRisk STRIDE report. 
 
The overall results of the case study support the 
idea that relational data models can be utilized for 
medical devices to generate actionable threat 
assessment criteria for healthcare organizations. The 
results of the technical aspects of this research indicate 
that it is possible to successfully integrate relational 
data models with threat vulnerability asset associations. 
The implementation of the MedDevRisk model with 
data from an operational medical simulation training 
unit demonstrates that the model can be used to 
generate actionable threat assessment criteria for 
healthcare organizations.  
Future research in this area will extend the existing 
research to include larger data samples and more 
diverse medical facilities. It will also explore 
automated data collection from static documents or 
web-based reports, schemas that acquire data in real–
time from multiple sources, along with the 
incorporation of more diverse attack models. 
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